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Abstract: The increasing use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in safety-critical missions in
both civilian and military areas demands accurate and reliable navigation, where one of the key
sources of navigation information is presented by Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).
In challenging conditions, for example, in urban areas, the accuracy of GNSS-based navigation
may degrade significantly due to user-satellite geometry and obscuration issues without being
noticed by the user. Therefore, considering the essentially dynamic rate of change in this type of
environment, integrity monitoring is of critical importance for understanding the level of trust we
have in positioning and timing data. In this paper, the dilution of precision (DOP) coefficients under
nominal and challenging conditions were investigated for the purpose of integrity monitoring in
urban environments. By analyzing positioning information in a simulated urban environment using
a software-based GNSS receiver, the integrity monitoring approach based on joint consideration
of GNSS observables and environmental parameters has been proposed. It was shown that DOP
coefficients, when considered together with a number of visible satellites and cut-off elevations
specific to the urban environment carry valuable integrity information that is difficult to get using
existing integrity monitoring approaches. This has allowed generating indirect integrity measures
based on cut-off elevation and satellite visibility that can be used for UAV path planning and guidance
in urban environments.
Keywords: GNSS-denied environment; DOP; integrity monitoring; navigation; urban air mobility; UAV
1. Introduction
Due to the growing interest in the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), research in the
Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC) area has become increasingly important. Navigation is one
of the key components of GNC, and it carries a number of important requirements to UAV performance
that play a key role in ensuring mission safety and success.
According to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Position, Navigation and Timing
(PNT) solutions are characterized by accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability within the
Performance Based Navigation (PBN) concept [1,2] as follows:
• Accuracy: The degree of conformance between the estimated or measured position and/or velocity
of a platform at a given time and its true position or velocity.
• Integrity: Integrity is the measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the
information supplied by a navigation system.
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• Continuity: The continuity of a system is the ability of the total system (comprising all elements
necessary to maintain aircraft position within the defined airspace) to perform its function without
interruption during the intended operation.
• Availability: The availability of a navigation system is the percentage of time that the services of
the system are usable by the navigator.
These four criteria are linked to each other by definition, as is shown in Figure 1. While accuracy
is the initial stage within PBN, the trustworthiness of a navigation system is specified based on the
confidence level of accuracy as integrity. Continuity is the simultaneous success rate of accuracy and
integrity requirements during an intended operation period. Lastly, the navigation system is available
only if accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements are fulfilled.
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PNT data is the most critical contributor to guidance and control stages, and the Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is one of the primary PNT sources here because of wide coverage, 
high accuracy, and relatively low cost of the corresponding navigation solutions. 
GNSS navigation is able to provide accurate positioning and timing data under the open space 
conditions for a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. Vulnerabilities of 
the GNSS-based PNT are also well known; it can be affected in both intended (jamming, spoofing, 
etc.) or unintended (multipath, atmospheric effects, etc.) ways. Many current and future applications 
of UAV are related to dull, dirty and dangerous (3D) tasks, e.g. work at natural disaster scenes, 
supporting public safety or routine goods delivery [3]. In many such cases, the navigation 
environment will inevitably become GNSS challenging, or even GNSS denied. The 3D applications 
of UAVs are mostly in urban environments and at the altitudes below building heights [4]. GNSS 
performance degrades during low altitude flights in urban areas because of masking and multipath 
effects from the buildings, structures and vegetation. In order to mitigate the degradation, various 
alternative PNT solutions are suggested as complementary navigation sources to work with GNSS in 
cooperation, while others focus on substitutes for GNSS [5]. Due to increased payload capacity of 
modern UAVs and better availability of high-quality sensors, multi-sensor navigation is one of the 
most promising complementary solutions for GNSS-based UAV navigation these days [6]. 
Conventionally, fusion of GNSS with Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is used for these  
purposes [7,8]. Additional sensors, such as LIDAR, odometer, magnetometer, etc., that can be used 
for fixing other navigation parameters are utilized for building a more comprehensive and reliable 
navigation system [9]. Vision-based methods [10], such as Simultaneous Localization and Mapping 
(SLAM) [11] and ground-based navigation systems [5] are also considered as alternative PNT sources 
for navigation in GNSS challenging or denied environments. 
While alternative PNT solutions have specific advantages in particular environments and 
missions, GNSS, however, remains the main navigation source (when it is available) as it provides 
the best positioning and timing in most of the cases. Hence, monitoring of GNSS performance is one 
of the critical tasks for future integrated multi-sensor navigation systems, which allows one to 
estimate and maintain the integrity of GNSS-based navigation and to make appropriate decisions, 
e.g., concerning required alternative sensors, fusion algorithm parameters or augmentation solutions. 
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GNSS-based PNT are also well known; it can be ffected in both intended (jamming, spoofing, etc.) or
unintended (multipath, a mospheric effects, etc.) ways. Many current and future applications of UAV
are related to dull, irty and angerous (3D) tasks, e.g. work at natural disaster scenes, supporting
public safety or routine goods delivery [3]. In many such cases, the navigation enviro ment will
ine itably become GNSS challenging, or even GNSS denied. The 3D applications of UAVs are m stly
in urban environments and at the altitudes below building heights [4]. GNSS performance degrades
during low altitude flights in urban areas because of masking and multipath effects from the buildings,
structures and vegetation. In order to mitigate the degradation, various alternative PNT solutions are
suggested as complementary navigation sources to work with GNSS in cooperation, while others focus
on substitutes for GNSS [5]. Due to increased payload capacity of modern UAVs and better availability
of high-quality sensors, multi-sensor navigation is one of the most promising complementary solutions
for GNSS-based UAV navigation these days [6]. Conventionally, fusion of GNSS with Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) is used for these purposes [7,8]. Additional sensors, such as LIDAR,
odometer, magnetometer, etc., that can be used for fixing other navigation parameters are utilized for
building a more comprehensive and reliable navigation system [9]. Vision-based methods [10], such as
Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) [11] and ground-based navigation systems [5] are
also considered as alternative PNT sources for navigation in GNSS challenging or denied environments.
While alternative PNT solutions have specific advantages in particular environments and missions,
GNSS, however, remains the main navigation source (when it is available) as it provides the best
positioning and timing in most of the cases. Hence, monitoring of GNSS performance is one of the
critical tasks for future integrated multi-sensor navigation systems, which allows one to estimate and
maintain the integrity of GNSS-based navigation and to make appropriate decisions, e.g., concerning
required alternative sensors, fusion algorithm parameters or augmentation solutions.
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The most common integrity monitoring approaches, which are currently in use are Satellite
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (SAIM), GNSS Integrity Channel (GIC) and Receiver Autonomous
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) [12], where SAIM focuses only on satellite and orbital errors, GIC takes
into account the environmental errors sourced by transmission environment and RAIM monitors
receive errors in addition to other errors from satellites and transmission paths. The range and position
error models are characterized in open-sky conditions in these integrity monitoring approaches;
therefore, integrity monitoring quality is highly degraded in urban environments because of the impact
of multipath and satellite obscuration. The following challenges exist for integrity monitoring in urban
air mobility applications [13]:
• Integrity monitoring algorithms require a large amount of data for integrity checks, but the
amount of available data dramatically decreases in urban environments because of limited
satellite visibility.
• Assumption of a single fault, which is frequently required for existing integrity monitoring
solutions, is no longer valid for urban environments due to multipath and line-of-sight issues.
Integrity measures, once available, could be used in multiple ways, e.g. for sensor switching
or performance prediction. For example, authors in [14] implemented a rule-based sensor switching
technique based on the integrity flags generated for each of the considered PNT sources. Another way
to use integrity information is presented in [15] with a performance prediction by a Bayesian network
based on the integrity failure rates of error sources.
It is known [16] that dilution of precision (DOP) coefficients are among the biggest contributors to
the positioning accuracy and, therefore, are linked to the integrity of the whole GNSS-based navigation
system. Usage of DOP fields in addition to the conventional potential field method is suggested in [17]
as one of the most recent and prospective examples of UAV path planning in known urban areas.
Geometric DOP and the number of visible satellites were simulated for two different constellations,
GPS and Galileo, and three different cut-off elevations at a specific time and position in [18]. Work [19]
also provides a distribution of DOP coefficients and the number of visible satellites for GPS, Galileo,
GLONASS and BeiDou under two different elevation levels. The satellite visibility and positioning
accuracy under different sky view conditions are analyzed in [20] for GPS and GLONASS. Another work
in the Asia–Australia region provides an ambiguity DOP and positioning accuracy analysis combining
GPS and Galileo constellations and regional navigation systems, IRNSS and QZSS [21]. All these
works analyze how DOP varies in time when different constellations are considered and under
different environmental conditions. However, analysis of the environmental parameters, such as
cut-off elevation and satellite visibility, for their joint use for integrity monitoring purposes received
little attention in the publications known to authors. Additionally, methods using DOP coefficients or
DOP mapping approaches have the following shortcomings for UAV integrity monitoring or path
planning applications in urban areas:
• In low-cost receivers, DOP coefficients are calculated by applying a matrix inversion to each
quad (four-combination) of the visible satellites (although there are some alternative methods) for
selecting subsets of satellites with optimal positioning performance [22]. The DOP update and
continuous mapping during the flight in this way are computationally very expensive and not
feasible for smaller UAVs. Instead, elevations and number of visible satellites can be extracted
from navigation message without any calculation for quick updates.
• DOP maps, even in a static environment, are time-varying because of the movement of satellites,
so their validity can change during the flight and integrity risks may increase. Due to their
time-varying nature, DOP maps are not well suited for the provision of integrity limitations.
With using time-independent environmental variables, such as cut-off elevation, integrity risks
can be analyzed more accurately before and during the flight.
The use of DOP coefficients for accuracy or availability characterization was thoroughly studied
by many authors. Nevertheless, application of DOP maps is mostly limited to availability analysis and
Robotics 2020, 9, 66 4 of 20
does not include integrity requirements. One of the most recent examples of DOP maps generation and
application can be seen in [23], where authors use scanned environment profiles for visibility analysis
and DOP prediction for an availability analysis. We use a different approach that can be beneficial
when no scanned information was available. Moreover, we focus on integrity analysis, which was not
covered previously using either DOP coefficients or elevation and visibility criteria.
Considering the previous works and mentioned challenges, this paper concerns integrity
monitoring of the GPS-based UAV positioning in urban environments. We focus on the analysis of
environmental parameters to derive limiting values suitable for integrity characterization within an
urban air mobility concept. For this purpose, we consider the influence of cut-off elevation and satellite
visibility on the behavior of DOP coefficients and, therefore, the integrity of the positioning for UAVs.
One of the key novelties of our integrity monitoring approach is in the proposition and use of
DOP-based indirect protection levels as the replacement of the standard position error-based protection
levels, as DOP coefficients can be extracted from receiver outputs during flight, unlike unobservable
position errors. Another novel proposition is to supplement DOP-based integrity measures with
parameters specific to the immediate environment that allow for estimating integrity in a particular
environment and can be used to decide on mitigation measures in cases of observed integrity failures.
2. Integrity Monitoring
The purpose of the integrity monitoring is to detect errors and generate timely warnings in case
the integrity limits are violated. The integrity criteria defined by ICAO [24] are:
• Horizontal/Vertical Protection Levels (HPL/VPL),
• Horizontal/Vertical Alert Limits (HAL/VAL),
• Time-to-Alert (TTA), and
• Integrity Risk.
VAL/HAL and VPL/HPL represent a vertical distance and a radius of circle in the horizontal plane
with center at the true user position, as illustrated in Figure 2 [25].
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TTA is the maximum allowable time before warnings, and accordingly, integrity risk is the
probability of computing a position that is out of defined bounds without warning within the TTA.
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Alert limits are defined based on the requirements of missions and applications, while protection levels
are calculated by users at the receiver level. Simply, protection levels are set statistically as boundaries
of the position errors of the particular navigation equipment.
Although there are no commonly accepted regulations for alert limits and TTA for UAV navigation,
an initial approximation can be obtained from ICAO’s requirements for Category I approach operations.
According to these requirements, vertical guidance (APV-I) is set to 40 m and 50 m for HAL and
VAL, respectively; TTA is specified as 10 s, and integrity risk should be less than 1−2 × 10−7/h. Alert
limits defined by the European GNSS Agency for safety-critical applications [26] are tighter: 5–10 m
horizontally and 10–25 m vertically. The environment for urban UAV operations can be characterized
based on reasonable assumptions of 30 m street width and 65 m building height, which are common in
the US and Europe [27]. Therefore, in this study, 10 m and 25 m are selected as HAL and VAL limits,
respectively, for positioning integrity simulations in urban environments using a generic GPS receiver.
Integrity can be monitored based on analysis of different types of errors. The error sources
that affect GNSS performance and their usage in integrity monitoring were discussed in [28,29].
RAIM is the simplest way for monitoring navigation performance because it only needs pseudo-range
measurements by the receiver. RAIM is not operational with less than five satellites, although the
pseudo-range measurements are still available. Additionally, because standard RAIM is able to detect
only one fault each time, it is not well suited for working in urban environments, where this assumption
is usually not valid. Advanced RAIM (ARAIM), Relative RAIM (R-RAIM) and Extended ARAIM
(ERAIM) algorithms are still under development, aiming to improve integrity monitoring and fault
detection performance, and the existing issues in urban applications are not solved yet [30].
SAIM systems specifically focus on satellite-based faults. Its efficiency in detecting orbital errors is
much better than both RAIM and GIC. However, its capability to detect user segment errors, which are
caused by local environments, stays behind RAIM. Orbital parameter errors are hard to detect at the
later stages when they are masked by other error sources, and if they cannot be detected, a persistent
error in positioning and timing may occur at the receiver [31]. Hence, the trustworthiness of the
ephemeris message should be checked at the user segment again. The validity check of ephemeris data
can be made at the receiver by using Issue of Data Ephemeris (IODE) [32], which is broadcasted in
sub-frames 2 and 3 separately.
Unlike RAIM and SAIM, GIC is an externally supported method; it relies on reference data from
control and monitoring stations for integrity analysis. GIC provides a direct and efficient integrity
monitoring, but it is a complex and slow technique because of the infrastructural requirements.
Its coverage area is also limited by the range of monitoring stations. Satellite-Based Augmentation
System (SBAS) and Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) can be mentioned as recent examples
of the GIC approach. However, they cannot detect local GNSS errors, such as multipath and obscuration,
in urban environments [33].
Overall, the usage of classical integrity monitoring approaches is challenging in urban
environments due to local error sources. Integrity monitoring systems in use have limited availability in
urban environments and cannot provide required integrity monitoring performance. Since availability
issues of integrity monitoring systems mostly depend on satellite visibility and satellite geometry
issues, DOP coefficients, cut-off elevations and number of visible satellites should be investigated in
order to improve integrity monitoring performance for local and urban applications.
The Stanford–ESA Integrity Diagram [34] is one of the useful tools that have been proposed in
order to identify and assess integrity risks and integrity failures. This diagram illustrates the integrity
risks based on a comparison between position error (PE), protection level (PL) and alert limit (AL).
Integrity events are defined through misleading operations, and hazardously operations with respect
to the specific areas of the Stanford–ESA Diagram as it is seen in Figure 3. During normal operations,
measurements are expected to appear in the white triangular zone, which represents the nominal
operating conditions. Although the Stanford diagram illustrates the integrity risks, TTA should be
additionally assessed in order to understand whether a limit exceeding is an integrity failure or not.
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A time-integrity plot is usually employed in this case; it provides the time history of position errors
that can be used to separate integrity failures and sudden changes.
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Vertical DOP (VDOP), East DOP (EDOP) and North DOP (NDOP). The relationship between DOP
coefficients is presented in Equation (2).
GDOP =
√
PDOP2 + TDOP2 , PDOP =
√





Although there is no common agreement on the terminology describing the quality of navigation
performance based on DOP coefficient values, DOP values are characterized in this study with respect
to similar works in the literature [18,19] and our test results as shown in Table 2.
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The integrity of the positioning and corresponding accuracy aspects directly depends on the
distribution of position error. In general, 95th percentile position error is used to characterize the
accuracy of the navigation system and its protection levels. However, integrity risks are defined at
the much stricter level with higher percentiles such as 99.99999th in order to make sure the position
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errors do not exceed specified HAL or VAL boundaries. For this kind of very sensitive estimation,
the standard deviation of error distribution is not always sufficient for ensuring the required reliability.
Gaussian overbound and sigma inflation methods have already been suggested in the recent researches
for correction of Gaussian distribution. While cumulative distribution function (cdf) overbounding
for unimodal and symmetric distributions [38] and paired overbounding [39] methods are the most
common examples, a combined method which involved both methods has been investigated in [40].
This combined method is applied at the data processing stage of our study for sigma corrections.
3. Simulation
3.1. Simulation Setup
A large amount of data is required to understand the impact of environmental parameters on
navigation performance. These data can be simulated, collected by a real receiver, or found from
publicly available databases. It should be noted though that isolation of the error sources in the datasets
from real scenarios is difficult due to uncertainties of the transmission environment. Moreover, it is
challenging to set a local urban environment in a way that addresses our test requirements entirely.
Even if it is possible, another challenge occurs at the space segment and transmission environment
arrangements since we have no control over them. Thus, a combination of software and hardware
simulation devices were selected in this study in order to simulate all segments of the GPS navigation
environment instead of experiments in a physical environment, where a real flight test in this sort of
GNSS challenging environments under high cut-off elevations will cause high safety risks.
The simulation environment employed in this study for integrity analysis consists of Spirent GNSS
Simulator GSS7000 controlled by the SimGen software as outlined in Figure 6. SimGen [41] provides
a variety of options to define scenarios and parameters related to all GNSS segments. Based on the
definitions set in SimGen, GSS7000 generates not only navigation messages but also the navigation
environment with all details, such as the position of satellites and receiver, potential faults, tropospheric
or ionospheric effects and obstructions. With scenario definitions in the GSS7000 simulator, effects of
different error sources in the navigation environment can be separated and studied independently.
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At the second step of the simulation enviro e t, a -based receiver model was used
to obtain position information based on the environ ent si ulated by GSS7000 for the following
analysis. When using real receivers for this type of experiment, results may change dramatically from
case to case depending on the quality of the receiver and specifics of the implemented algorithms.
Therefore, the software receiver has been selected to conduct experiments in order to minimize effects
of unknown receiver-based errors, ensure reproducibility of results and allow for future algorithms
improvement studies.
In this work, an open source receiver model, goGPS [41], was used for fundamental receiver
calculations. In our tests, inputs and outputs of the model were modified to integrate it with GSS7000
and observe desired navigational parameters. The input data for the receiver model are presented
in Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services (RTCM) format; outputs are DOP coefficients,
with receiver position expressed in Latitude–Longitude–Altitude (LLA) and in East–North–Up (ENU)
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coordinates. For simplicity, the receiver’s initial position was selected as (0,0,0) based on LLA
coordinates, and the urban environment was produced in the environment editor of the simulator.
Simulations in this study were conducted based on a single frequency (L1) GPS constellation
scenario for a generic urban environment defined through the corresponding elevation map in the
simulator. Assuming that the receiver is at the ground level, the cut-off elevation angles in urban
areas vary between 20 and 60 degrees. A value of 30◦ was taken as the maximum value for cut-off
elevation during the simulations; beyond this value, the GPS-based navigation is not usable according
to preliminary results. The other assumptions made were as follows: UAV is flying a maximum of
10 m below the roof level and in the middle of 30 m wide street with a 30◦ maximum cut-off elevation.
The flowchart of the proposed approach for analyzing integrity is shown in Figure 7.
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At the first simulation, the refere c t t cc racy as established.
Posit oning results were acquired and alyzed statistic lly under 5◦ cut-off elevation, which represents
th open sky condition. Six test constellations with different DOP values, as shown in Table 3,
were defined in the Spirent GSS7000 simulator, and navigation messages were gen rated for each
of them. Since the DOP is affected by variation in the numbers of satellites available to the receiver,
test constellations were limited to four visible satellites. Other satellites were disabled for each test to
cancel the effect of the number of visible satellites.
Positioning outputs of the selected software receiver were collected for 30 min (approximately
1800 measurements). Probability density function (pdf) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
the positioning error were produced from these outputs. Thirty-minute simulation provides reliable
test data for each case; at the same time, it allows one to prevent dramatic DOP changes and loss of
satellite visibility because of the movement of the satellites. The errors were obtained through the
comparison of positioning data from the receiver with the ground truth from the simulator. From the
analysis of positioning accuracy results, also utilizing the sigma inflation technique for better error
representation, the upper DOP limits were specified to reflect alert limits. Then, indir ct protection
levels are defined as HDOP and VDOP values that are ensuring the integrity risks remain below
1−2 × 10−7/h.
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Table 3. Simulation scenarios.
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3 4.85 3 15◦
4 7.09 4 20◦
5 13.56 5 25◦
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At the second simulation, the distributions of DOP coefficients and the number of visible satellites
were obtained under different cut-off elevations. Simulation for each cut-off elevation was covering a
twelve hour period from 12 am to 12 pm on August 30, 2019. The twelve-hour period was intentionally
selected for this simulation to match the orbital period of GPS satellites (~11.967 h); this period should
give a comprehensive overview of visible satellites’ configurations. Simulated cut-off elevations for
this simulation start at 5◦ and increase by 5◦ up to 30◦. Using these results the limiting values of
cut-off elevation and number of visible satellites can be derived based on predefined HDOP and VDOP,
which, in turn, correspond to positioning error boundaries obtained from the first simulation. Lastly,
indirect protection levels (integrity zones) mapping is produced according to the results of the first and
second simulations.
3.2. Simulation Results
During the statistical analysis of the first simulation results, mean values, 67th percentiles, and 95th
percentiles of absolute position error of all simulated cases were calculated as presented in Table 4.
As expected, position errors steadily increase with increasing DOP coefficients. Considering assumed
alert limits from Section 2 (10 m horizontally and 25 m vertically) one can see from Table 4 that position
errors are within the alert limits for the first four test cases. More specifically, the 95th percentile of the
horizontal error is within alert limits when HDOP ≤ 3.13, and for the vertical error, this is also true
when VDOP ≤ 5.13. In cases 5 and 6, navigation based on GPS only cannot be considered safe both
horizontally and vertically.
For the purposes of integrity analysis, 95th percentile error cannot provide enough confidence to
meet assumed integrity requirements. According to the assumed integrity requirements, the expected
rate of position error measurements falling outside of the nominal operation zone in the Stanford–ESA
Diagram should not exceed 1−2 × 10−7/h. Integrity failure occurs when PE > PL > AL during more
than TTA, which is specified as 10 s. For generality and reproducibility of the results, achievable HPL
and VPL are calculated based on UERE of the employed receiver, which represents the condition where
HDOP and VDOP equal 1. In this case, derivation of achievable protection levels for different test
configurations is a straightforward task.
Achievable protection levels are calculated from position error and DOP measurements of the
first four test cases since PE is higher than AL in the last two cases. For more sensitive analysis,
sigma correction following approach [40] is also applied while obtaining the pdf of the position errors.
The 99.99998th percentile of UERE is accepted as a protection level to guarantee that integrity risk is
below 1−2 × 10−7/h.
The alert limits we have specified in Section 2 are based on assumptions about the urban
environment, such as buildings’ heights and street sizes, which may be changed, for instance,
for applications with more strict requirements to positioning errors. If this is a case, requirements to
acceptable HDOP and VDOP will be tightened. Additionally, since HPL and VPL are specified based
on the employed receiver model performance, protection levels can slightly change for another receiver
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model based on its UERE. Calculated UERE based on Equation (1) and its 95th, 99th and 99.99998th
percentile values after sigma correction are presented in Table 5. Protection levels with various DOP
values can be calculated according to Equation (6).
HPL = HDOP·UERE99.99998, VPL = VDOP·UERE99.99998, (6)
where UERE99.99998 is the 99.99998th percentile of UERE.
Table 4. Position error statistics for different DOP levels.
GDOP Error Type
Absolute Error Statistics
Mean (m) 67th Percentile (m) 95th Percentile (m)
1.69
Horizontal (HDOP = 0.75) 1.5131 1.5864 1.7707
Vertical (VDOP = 1.33) 6.2144 6.3695 6.7599
Position (PDOP = 1.53) 6.3973 6.5574 6.9605
2.90
Horizontal (HDOP = 1.39) 3.3590 3.6096 4.2403
Vertical (VDOP = 2.26) 5.0558 6.4321 9.8960
Position (PDOP = 2.65) 6.2087 7.4673 10.6350
4.85
Horizontal (HDOP = 1.80) 3.4340 3.5286 3.7666
Vertical (VDOP = 3.92) 8.4715 10.3767 15.1717
Position (PDOP = 4.32) 9.3049 11.0302 15.3726
7.09
Horizontal (HDOP = 3.13) 3.3777 3.5354 3.9325
Vertical (VDOP = 5.13) 10.9519 11.5978 13.2235
Position (PDOP = 6.01) 11.4723 12.0931 13.6559
13.56
Horizontal (HDOP = 5.78) 24.3396 26.8177 33.0549
Vertical (VDOP = 10.07) 53.0153 55.6420 62.2532
Position (PDOP = 11.61) 58.3893 61.8051 70.4026
31.96
Horizontal (HDOP = 14.82) 58.9134 68.3176 91.9872
Vertical (VDOP = 22.89) 96.7132 109.5804 141.9660
Position (PDOP = 27.27) 113.2787 129.1622 169.1396
Table 5. UERE of employed GNSS receiver.
Mean Sigma Corrected Sigma 95th Percentile 99th Percentile 99.99998th Percentile
1.9420 m 0.7606 m 0.7479 m 3.1722 m 3.6819 m 5.8306 m
After specifying base values of HPL and VPL considering HDOP = VDOP = 1, the impact of
cut-off elevation on DOP coefficients should be investigated to derive achievable protection levels
under various cut-off elevation levels.
Table 6 shows the distribution of DOP coefficients for different cut-off elevation levels. It can
be seen that for cut-off elevations up to 5◦ HDOP is less than 1 with 95.08% probability. Similarly,
HDOP is always less than 2 and 3 for cut-off elevations at or below 15◦ and 20◦, respectively. At the
25◦ level, the probability of HDOP being higher than 5 is approximately 1.6%. Starting from a cut-off
elevation of 30◦, availability issues begin to appear due to insufficient number of visible satellites.
When analyzing vertical performance, we can see that VDOP coefficients are always less than 2 at
5◦ cut-off elevation without observable risk and with 3% risk at 10◦. VDOP at these cut-off elevations
is always less than 3. At 15◦, VDOP remains below 5 with no integrity risk. At 20◦, while the risk is
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about 4% for VDOP = 5, VDOP = 7 can be guaranteed. When the cut-off elevation is at or above 25◦,
vertical positioning availability issues start to be observed.





Percentage of DOP Values in a Given Ranges (x = DOP Value)
x < 1 1 < x < 2 2 < x < 3 3 < x < 5 5 < x < 7 7 < x < 10 10 < x N/A
5◦
GDOP 0 91.42 8.58 0 0 0 0 0
PDOP 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDOP 95.08 4.92 0 0 0 0 0 0
VDOP 1.99 98.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
TDOP 98.91 1.09 0 0 0 0 0 0
10◦
GDOP 0 56.25 43.75 0 0 0 0 0
PDOP 0 78.99 21.01 0 0 0 0 0
HDOP 73.81 26.19 0 0 0 0 0 0
VDOP 0 96.97 3.03 0 0 0 0 0
TDOP 79.13 20.87 0 0 0 0 0 0
15◦
GDOP 0 4.03 88.89 5.87 1.21 0 0 0
PDOP 0 27.53 70.68 1.79 0 0 0 0
HDOP 50.81 49.19 0 0 0 0 0 0
VDOP 0 82.82 15.39 1.79 0 0 0 0
TDOP 23.65 74.50 1.06 0.75 0.04 0 0 0
20◦
GDOP 0 0 52.69 35.42 8.40 0.71 2.78 0
PDOP 0 1.45 72.72 20.62 1.89 2.72 0.60 0
HDOP 24.81 72.30 2.89 0 0 0 0 0
VDOP 0 32.26 48.08 15.94 0.57 3.15 0 0
TDOP 2.23 73.95 13.59 6.76 1.94 1.53 0 0
25◦
GDOP 0 0 7.42 41.97 20.47 13.35 12.60 4.19
PDOP 0 0 23.75 39.09 16.03 11.15 5.79 4.19
HDOP 5.67 66.79 19.29 6.67 0.93 0.39 0.26 0
VDOP 0 0.15 34.12 32.84 13.14 12.60 2.96 4.19
TDOP 0.01 31.79 24.82 21.94 9.73 5.49 2.03 4.19
30◦
GDOP 0 0 0 18.02 20.46 14.63 28.50 18.39
PDOP 0 0 2.26 24.34 20.10 14.76 20.15 18.39
HDOP 0 45.07 19.54 19.18 6.81 2.46 3.23 3.72
VDOP 0 0 7.07 27.94 15.48 16.34 14.78 18.39
TDOP 0 4.44 18.51 24.05 13.47 13.02 8.12 18.39
Using these distributions of HDOP and VDOP, achievable protection levels can be derived
following Equation (6) for each cut-off elevation, to be used as indirect integrity measures instead of
the corresponding non-observable position errors. The 99.99998th percentiles of HDOP and VDOP
distributions for each cut-off elevation are accepted for this purpose.
Calculated horizontal and vertical protection levels with less than 2 × 10−7/h integrity risk are
shown in Table 7 along with the corresponding DOP-based indirect protection levels. It should be noted
that some values were not defined during the simulation. Because of unavailability issues, HPL cannot
be defined at 30◦, and VPL cannot be defined for 25◦ and 30◦ cut off elevations. These cut-off elevations
represent essential integrity risks for flights of UAVs with single-mode GPS-based navigation in
urban environments.
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Table 7. DOP-based Protection Levels.
Cut-Off Elevation HDOP-Based HPL HPL (m) VDOP-Based VPL VPL (m)
5◦ 1.3373 7.7973 2.0839 12.1504
10◦ 1.6109 9.3925 2.5246 14.7199
15◦ 1.8723 10.9166 3.6817 21.4665
20◦ 2.7898 16.2662 9.5747 55.8262
25◦ 7.2001 41.9809 N/A N/A
30◦ N/A N/A N/A N/A
As a complementary tool for integrity analysis, the time history of HDOP and VDOP coefficients
during half-day simulation under different cut-off elevations can be used as shown in Figure 8.
Horizontal dotted lines represent DOP-based indirect protection levels. The figure shows when,
for how long and how often these protection levels are exceeded during the simulation period;
therefore, a time-to-alert analysis can be conducted based on these graphs.




Figure 8. Time history of Horizontal DOP (HDOP) (top), Vertical DOP (VDOP) (bottom) during the 
simulated period. 
Using results from Figure 9, the smallest number of visible satellites can be established for each 
cut-off elevation. It can be seen that at 20° cut-off elevation at least five satellites are visible. At 15° 
cut-off elevation, this number increases to six. At 10° and 5° cut-off elevations, there are seven and 
eight visible satellites during the 12 h simulation period, respectively. It can also be seen that the 
required minimum of four satellites cannot be guaranteed at all times at 25° cut-off elevation. They 
are only visible for approximately 96% of the simulation time.  
Figure 8. Time history of Horizontal DOP (HDOP) (top), Vertical DOP (VDOP) (bottom) during the
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Below 20◦ cut-off elevation, both HDOP and VDOP coefficients are measurable for all time without
any availability issues. Sharp increases in HDOP and VDOP values are observed above 20◦ and 25◦
cut-off elevations, respectively. Specified HPLs are not exceeded below 20◦ cut-off elevations. However,
at 25◦ cut off elevation, observed horizontal integrity failures are two times longer than the TTA limit:
42 s and 210 s. Besides, vertical integrity failures are observed too: at 15◦ as a continuous event of
duration 672 s and at 20◦—continuously over a period of 408 s.
Using results from Figure 9, the smallest number of visible satellites can be established for each
cut-off elevation. It can be seen that at 20◦ cut-off elevation at least five satellites are visible. At 15◦
cut-off elevation, this number increases to six. At 10◦ and 5◦ cut-off elevations, there are seven and
eight visible satellites during the 12 h simulation period, respectively. It can also be seen that the
required minimum of four satellites cannot be guaranteed at all times at 25◦ cut-off elevation. They are
only visible for approximately 96% of the simulation time.
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satellites. So, we need to intr duce another parameter to guarantee that the alert limits are not exceeded
when cut-off elevation is high. Variation of DOP is not only dependent on cut-off elevation in urban
environments but is also directly related to the number of visible satellites. In order to demonstrate
this effect, let us consider together Figure 8, which shows a time history of DOP variation over a 12 h
simulation period and Figure 9, showing how the number of visible satellites changes during the same
period of time for each cut-off elevation. It can be seen from these figures that poor satellite visibility
causes sharp increases of HDOP and VDOP.
4. Discussion
According to the above results, one can see that the nu ber of visible satellites along ith the
cut-off elevations can be used to characterize integrity based on observed P values. In order to
derive limiting cut-off elevations based on the acceptable integrity risks, we first explore the relationship
between satellite visibility and DOP. For this purpose, 99.99998th percentiles of HDOP and VDOP are
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calculated from the results of the second simulation for each number of visible satellites, as shown
in Figure 10. In this figure the relationship between DOP and satellite visibility can be analyzed
independently from the cut-off elevations. It shows the necessary number of visible satellites that
provides the required, for a given integrity, the upper boundary of DOP, which is especially important
at high blockage conditions.
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According to hese result , DOP-based in irect pro ecti n levels can be specified using cut-off elevation
and s tellite visibility to describe GPS-based positioning integrity in terms of prot ction level zones.
To explain how this can be achieved, let us consider an example of the protection level zone in
Figure 11 expressed in the form of HDOP < 1.3373, which corresponds to Figure 12. HPL = 7.7973 m
and 5◦ cut-off elevation with regards to Table 7. The smallest number of visible satellites observed
during the simulation corresponding to 5◦ cut-off elevation is 8, following results shown in Figure 9.
These two parameters define the primary boundaries of the protection level (integrity) zone. Inside each
zone, it can be considered that integrity requirements can be guaranteed for specified protection levels.
To define secondary boundaries, the minimum number of visible satellites to guarantee
HDOP < 1.3373 is taken from Figure 10 as 10. According to Figures 9 and 10 visible satellites
can be observed only up to 15◦ cut off elevation. Hence, 10 visible satellites and 15◦ cut-off elevation
forms secondary boundaries of the protection level zone. These secondary boundaries are required
to cover the cases where cut-off elevation is exceeded, but there are still enough satellites to satisfy
integrity requirements.
Finally, the union of these two zones defines the integrity zone based on indirect protection levels
considering both cut-off elevation and satellite visibility.
Following this idea, we have compiled results of the second simulation in Figure 12,
which visualizes indirect protection levels (in the form of the limiting DOP values) with respect
to cut-off elevations and number of visible satellites.
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Considering that the integrity failure condition when HPL > HAL, we specify integrity zones
based on HPL = HAL and VPL = VAL. To maintain the required integrity level UAV should stay within
these zones during the flight. Assumed in Section 2 HAL and VAL for the scenario of UAV flight in
urban environment (10 and 25 m, respectively) transform into limits of HDOP < 1.87 and VDOP < 3.68
according to our simulation results. From Figure 12, it follows that UAV should be within green,
yellow or orange zones in order to satisfy these requirements. The conditions can be checked using
observables obtained from the receiver position solution and environmental parameters. If one of the
three arguments (DOP, number of visible satellites and cut-off elevation) are outside of the boundaries,
the integrity flag should be raised followed by the predefined mitigation measure.
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If the environment is k own, the operational altitud of the UAV and the route can be defined
before the flight in order to avoid exce ding he alert limits. If this happ ns anyway, UA can ascend
and decrease cut-off elevati to cope with pot ntial GPS losses. If there is no chance to ascend because
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of the mission requirements or environment limitations, alternative navigation sensors or systems
must be activated to continue flight.
Another point for discussion is how UAV acquires information for this type of integrity monitoring
during the flight. Number of visible satellites and satellite elevations can be read from the broadcasted
navigation message. As the cut-off elevation is dependent on both the height of buildings and altitude
of UAV, it can be either estimated from visible satellite elevations or measured as the angle between
UAV and the top of buildings. This can be done using additional sensor data or data extracted from
an external source, such as a 3D map. Detection of this angle is out of the scope of this study but is
included in the scope of future work.
Suggested protection levels and operational zones will support path and mission planning either
before or during the flight. Because of the variation of building heights in urban environments,
transitions between the operational zones will be happening during the flight. Considering changes in
urban environments, the most critical advantage of our approach against the direct usage of DOP is
quick integrity update capabilities at low computational cost.
Another important advantage of our approach is generality and time independency. DOP maps
can be generated based on predicted DOP levels for known environments only, e.g., using scanned
results. However, these maps are not available if the environment is not known or changed. DOP can
also significantly change during the flight because of the movements of satellites; therefore, maps should
be accounting for these changes too.
The findings from the analysis of the impact of cut-off elevation and number of visible satellites
on DOP coefficients are generic for any kind of urban air mobility application as these results are
independent of the receiver model. However, the relationship between DOP and position error is
dependent on the employed receiver model. It should be taken into account that equivalent horizontal
and vertical position errors for specified DOP levels might change based on the receiver UERE.
5. Conclusions
Due to the dependence of GNSS positioning integrity on satellite visibility and environmental
constraints, joint use of DOP coefficients, number of visible satellites and cut-off elevation in urban
environments was investigated in this study for integrity monitoring purposes. An integrity monitoring
approach utilizing these features and characterized by low computational requirements was proposed
for UAV navigation using a standalone GPS receiver. The approach employs DOP-based protection
levels and defines zones where integrity is maintained at the desired level utilizing information on
visible satellite number and cut-off elevation as an environmental parameter. The proposed integrity
analysis approach will be beneficial for UAV path planning and guidance tasks for urban unmanned
traffic management (UTM) applications.
The results and specified limits in this study are proposed based on single constellation—GPS.
Performance of other constellations and their combinations should be analyzed as a part of future work
to understand to what extent multi-constellation navigation can enhance positioning integrity in urban
environments. Inclusion of multipath effects into consideration is another topic for future research.
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